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Challenges for Technological
Development in China’s Industry
Foreign investors are the main providers of technology
Cong Cao
1 Since the late 1970s, and especially during the 1990s, foreign direct investment (FDI) 1
has  to  a  large  extent  recast  China’s  industrial  base  and  upgraded  its  industrial
technology2.  In 2001, China became the country with the highest number of mobile
phone subscribers with 145 million users, and its 179 million fixed phone lines were the
second highest, next to the United States3. By 2010, if not earlier, and, after overtaking
Japan in 2002, China is expected to overtake the United States to become the world’s
largest PC market4. The Internet, barely known in China until the mid-1990s, now has
almost 80 million users5. Products “Made in China” have moved beyond toys, garments,
and sneakers and include consumer electronics products and high-tech gadgets. 
2 According to a recent United Nations report,  China was the tenth largest high-tech
exporting country in the world in 1998 to 19996. In 2003, China’s high-tech exports hit
US$110.3 billion, a more than 41-fold increase over 19917. Recently, China began using
technology  standards—notably  the  third-generation  wireless  standard  TD-SCDMA
(Time Division-Synchronous Code Division Multiple  Access)  and wireless  encryption
standard WAPI  (Wired Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure)–as  its  technology
policy  instrument8.  In  twenty  years,  China  has  evolved  from a  closed  and  planned
economy dominated by agriculture and heavy industry to an open economy driven by
information, knowledge and skills.
3 Yet,  whether Chinese industry and its  high-tech sector can actually  sustain growth
remains a question. In fact, the Chinese technological reality is either not well known,
or  has  been  distorted  or  misunderstood.  Being  further  integrated  into  the  world
economy since entering the WTO, China is facing fiercer international competition. The
question  is  whether  China  will  be  able  to  develop  an  indigenous  technological
capability, in the near and medium term, to support its capacity to be competitive in
the world markets. 
Some examples in technological development in Chinese industry
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4 Although technological development seems a priority, Chinese firms encounter much
difficulty  in  attaining  sophistication  in  technology,  mainly  because  they  lack  the
necessary capabilities.  This leads to price wars,  patent infringements,  and generally
speaking, a difficulty upgrading to more sophisticated technology.
Continuous price wars: the television sector
5 China’s television (TV) sector has recently attracted great attention. In November 2003,
TCL, a consumer electronics producer in China, merged its TV manufacturing facilities
with those of its French counterpart Thompson. The combined company, in which TCL
holds a 67% share, is expected to ship 18 million TVs in 2004, thus coming top with 10%
of  the  market.  But  in  the  meantime,  TCL,  along  with  fellow  Chinese  TV-makers
Changhong, Konka and Xoceco, lost a US Department of Commerce anti-dumping case.
6 Using price as a  weapon in the TV sector–anti-dumping being a countermeasure–is
nothing new within China. Since 1996, the Chinese market has witnessed a series of TV
price  wars.  In  the  name of  defending  the  indigenous  industry,  price  wars  do  help
domestic firms gain market share over their foreign competitors. But the rising market
share of some of the Chinese firms is most likely at the expense of their domestic peers
or even themselves9. As price wars eat up their profit margins, many TV makers sell at
lower-then-cost prices. In 2001, TV manufacturers saw the average profit level further
reduced from 2.26% in 1999 to 2.05%, and a nearly 3 billion yuan industry-wide loss10.
7 Prices are related to supply and demand. At a time when demand for TVs exceeded
supply,  local  governments  piled into  the  sector  that  had an artificially  low market
entry barrier, and then used a high degree of protection to ensure captive markets for
local  products  and  prevent  unprofitable  firms  under  their  jurisdictions  from being
acquired.  Then,  overcapacity  occurred as  a  result  of  duplicate  economic activity  at
many Chinese firms that  were set  up just  for  the sake of  creating employment for
excess labour11. Moreover, China’s TV manufacturers do not possess core technologies
in very large-scale integrated circuits, tubes, displays, etc.
Infringement of foreign patents: the case of DVD players
8 In  early  2002,  China-made  DVD  players  were  impounded  by  customs  in  several
European countries  with the  charge  that  their  manufacturers  had not  paid  for  the
patents used. Later,  Philips,  Sony and Pioneer waged a legal battle in the European
Union court,  pressuring Chinese DVD player manufacturers to pay royalties for the
technologies. Initially, payment was requested at US$20 per DVD machine, which the
Chinese side claimed to be too high, given the sales price of a player being only US$9012.
Through negotiation, these firms settled by agreeing to pay Philips, Sony and Pioneer
US$5.  They also later reached agreements with other foreign companies on royalty
payments: 4% of the sales price or US$4, whichever is higher, for each player to NEC,
Panasonic, Toshiba, JVC, Mitsubishi and Time Warner, US$10 to DTS, US$4.95 to Dolby
Laboratories, and US$2.5 to MPEG LA. Most recently, Thompson, the partner of TCL,
requested a payment of US$1 or US$1.5, depending upon where the player is sold, China
or abroad. With the number of DVD players made in China in 2003 being at least 50
million, the total payment amount was huge13.
9 Such  incidents  have  been  typical  of  the  Chinese  industry  in the  past  decade.
Multinational corporations (MNCs) have gradually moved the production of consumer
electronics  products  from  the  United  States  and  Japan  to  Singapore,  South  Korea,
Taiwan and Hong Kong, and then to China and other countries with low labour costs;
but they use critical technology patents as leverages and also focus on developing next-
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generation  products  or  technology  embodied  in  the  existing  products.  China  was
supposed to have thus absorbed and assimilated such technology and to have gradually
developed  indigenous  products  and  climbed  the  ladder  of  technological  learning.
Unfortunately, this has not happened; and therefore, located downstream of the global
value  chain,  China  has  no  choice  but  to  continue  to  pay  for  the  use  of  foreign
technology.  In  the  meantime,  the  homogenisation  and  commoditisation  of  these
products have inevitably dragged Chinese firms into price competition. As such, their
earning power has diminished significantly.  TV manufacturer  Changhong made the
same profit from its sales of 6.94 million sets as Sony achieved through its sales of half a
million sets14.
10 The phenomenon is not limited to the consumer electronics industry.  Take Legend,
China’s largest PC manufacturer, as an example15. In 1998, it took over IBM to become
the  leader  in  China’s  PC  market.  But  as  Liu  Chuanzhi,  Legend’s  chairman,
acknowledged, the company has merely played the role of a “mover” (banyungong) for
foreign  technology16.  Similarly,  having  spent  several  billion  dollars  importing  first-
generation analog technology and second-generation global  mobile  communications
(GSM) technology, China’s mobile communications industry is still under the shadow of
foreign  technology.  Although  domestically  manufactured  mobile  handsets  held  a
market share of more than 50% in 2003, a dramatic increase from 5% in 2000, Motorola
and Nokia have sold more phones to Chinese customers while many of those shipped by
Bird, China’s number one handset maker, are still sitting in warehouses or on store
shelves17.  Moreover,  as  few  firms  have  devoted  themselves  to  technological
development,  each  and  every  mobile  phone  made  in  China  contains  critical
components that have to be imported from abroad18. China’s handset market has also
been experiencing the familiar and disastrous price wars and the profit erosion19. And
although the exact amount of money that China Unicom paid for Qualcomm’s code
division multiple  access  (CDMA) technology is  unknown,  it  includes an entry fee,  a
software licence fee,  and a fee linked to the number of subscribers or revenues.  In
addition, recently, Cisco Systems, the world’s leading networking and communications
manufacturer,  accused  China’s  switcher/router  developer  Huawei  Technologies  of
patent  infringement20.  Foreseen  areas  of  contention  involving  intellectual  property
rights in China include automobiles and digital TVs.
High-tech exports: comparative or competitive advantages?
11 A high-tech industry is, loosely speaking, one in which its success depends largely on
its ability to keep up with rapid innovations in products or production processes, or
both21.  Microelectronics,  biotechnology,  new materials,  telecommunications,  civilian
aviation,  robotics plus  machine  tools,  and  computers  hardware  and  software  are
considered  to  be  crucial  to  success  amid  current  global  competition22.  Statistical
classifications of high-tech industry typically rely on such indicators as the ratio of
research  and development  (R&D)  expenditures  to  sales,  the  share  of  scientists  and
engineers  in  the  labour  force,  and  so  on.  The  US  Bureau  of  Census  has  adopted  a
separate classification code, “advanced technology” for products meeting the following
criteria:  the underlined technology is  from a recognised high technology field (e.g.,
biotechnology, information technology);  the technology used is leading-edge in that
field23.
12 In China, a firm is to register and to be certified as high-tech only if it falls into the
above-mentioned categories and meets the following requirements: at least 30% of its
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employees have college or higher level education, more than 5% of its sales is spent on
R&D, and more than 60% of its sales is related to technology services and high-tech
products24. High-tech in China’s trade statistical reporting system until 1998 referred to
computers  and  telecommunications,  life  science,  aerospace  and  aeronautics,
electronics,  weapons,  opto-electronics,  computer  integrated  manufacturing,  nuclear
technology, biotechnology, and advanced materials. More recently, China has reported
high-tech trade statistics under a new scheme, in which trade in weapons and nuclear
technology  are  omitted  while  a  new  “other  technology”  category  was  introduced–
presumably combined weapons and nuclear technology.
13 But  a  particular  high-tech  category  could  be  further  divided  into  different  levels
according to technological intensity and resulting profit and added value. Take PCs as
an example. The first level is central processing units and core software, which has
been dominated by the Wintel model (microprocessors from Intel and operating system
and  major  applications  packages  from  Microsoft).  The  second,  including  such  key
elements as integrated circuits, memory chips, and displayers, enjoys a higher level of
risk  as  well  as  profit.  The  third  and  the  lowest  level  is  the  assembling  and
manufacturing  of  terminal  products,  which  involve  a  lower  level  of  technological
intensity but higher logistics costs and the advantages of which are reflected through
economies of scale and localised sales and services25.  China it  seems has been stuck
largely at the lowest level of the high-tech value chain.
14 One measure of the high-tech industry is trade statistics. However, comparable high-
tech trade data are difficult to locate not only because the “high-tech” definition is
dynamic but also because it varies across countries. Here, we use both data from official
Chinese sources and from the United States. The American data provide comparable
trade  statistics  for  economies  in  the  world26 and  allow  the  calculation  of  Trade
Competitiveness (TC)27 and Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA)28.
15 Having  experienced  a  steady  increase,  high-tech  exports  seem  to  be an  important
growth  engine  of  the  Chinese  economy  (Figure  1).  As  measured  by  Trade
Competitiveness (TC), China’s high-tech competitiveness in trade has been improved
from –0.53 in 1991 to –0.04 in 2003 according to the Chinese data. If the data from the
American source is  used,  however,  China’s  TC in  high-tech has  declined slightly  in
recent years (Figure 2). Among the nine high-tech categories defined by the Chinese
statistics, computer and telecommunications, aerospace, and advanced materials have
gained  international  competitiveness,  opto-electronics  and  the  other  technology
category  have  lost competitive  advantages,  while  electronics,  computer-integrated
manufacturing,  life science,  and biotechnology have not seen much change in their
trade  patterns.  As  a  whole,  computer-integrated  manufacturing,  other  technology,
aerospace, and electronics are the least competitive.
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1. China’s high-tech trade (US$ billion)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Science and Technology (eds), China Statistical
Yearbook on Science and Technology 2003, Peking, China Statistics Press, 2003.
 
2. Competitiveness of China’s high-tech trade
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Science and Technology (eds.), China Statistical
Yearbook on Science and Technology 2003, op. cit., and National Science Board, Science and Engineering
Indicators 2002, Arlington, VA, National Science Foundation, 2002.
16 China’s high-tech trade deficits have been fluctuating but increasing, which shows its
high demand for and dependence upon advanced foreign technology. Although China
has enjoyed a trade surplus in computer and telecommunications technology over the
years, TC (0.39 for 2003) is less than the critical 0.5 threshold, suggesting that China is
still behind in this the largest trade sector, which accounted for 83.3% of the high-tech
exports in 2003. Trade deficits have been growing gradually in almost all other high-
tech sectors, especially in electronics and computer-integrated manufacturing, with an
exception in biotechnology in which the trade surplus has been very small.  Similar
results could be obtained using data from the American source as well, with “office and
computing  machinery”  and  “communications  equipment”  gaining  ground  but  still
being far from the 0.5 reading, “drugs and medicines” suffering a dramatic loss, while
“aerospace” experienced little change.
17 Here, I will use the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) method to further measure
how competitive China’s particular high-tech fields are in the world (Figure 3).  The
“office  and  computing  machinery”  category  had  been  the  only  high-tech  sector  in
which China has gained significantly in the international markets recently, as indicated
by a remarkable increase in its RCA from 0.076, a very low competitiveness reading, in
1980,  to  a  strong  trade  competitiveness level  of  1.30  in  1998.  The  RCA  for
“communications  equipment”  increased  between  1980  and  1990  and  declined
thereafter, and the competitiveness of the “aerospace” industry had been improving,
though not well. However, “drugs and medicines” witnessed its RCA erode significantly
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over  the  period  in  which  comparable  data  are  available—from  a  very  competitive
industry to one that was no longer competitive.
 
3. Revealed comparative advantages of China’s high-tech trade 
Source: National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2002, op. cit.
18 In the 1990s, China progressed in international high-tech exports. But what was behind
these impressive trade statistics? First, while the export-oriented strategy has clearly
shown results,  processing  and  assembling  with  supplied  materials  from abroad  for
export accounted for about 90% of China’s high-tech exports in 2002.29 There is doubt as
to whether China has acquired much advanced technology in assembling, although in
terms of  technology  content,  FDI  (foreign  direct  investment)  in  China  in  the  early
twenty-first century is presumably very different from the FDI it was receiving in 1985
or even in the early 1990s30.
19 Second,  the  export-led  high-tech industry  has  been based on low labour  costs  and
imported foreign technologies or even components. China has become an important
assembly  line  for  products  made  using  key  high-tech  parts  from  abroad  with  the
addition of low-tech domestic components. The majority of Chinese exports are lower-
end products involving basic processing and manufacturing techniques, while imports
in  general  are  much  more  sophisticated31.  There  has  been  a  tendency  among  the
world’s  leading  MNCs,  especially  those  in  the  information  and  communications
technology  (ICT)  sector,  to  move  their  manufacturing  facilities,  or  outsource
production, to China, which, unfortunately, is not due to the nation’s competitiveness
in technology, but largely its comparative advantage in labour32. China has moved and
will move steadily upmarket and anything–high- or low-tech–that requires many parts
to be assembled in an efficient manner at low cost will find an attractive production
base in China, which, in the purest sense of the term, is globalisation at work33. Being
labour- rather than technology-intensive, those so-called “high-tech” gadgets have a
profit  margin of  sometimes as  low as  2-3%.  For  example,  Wanda,  a  wireless  mouse
manufactured by Logitech International SA, a Swiss-American company, sells  in the
United States for around US$40, of which China takes a meagre US$3 for wages, power,
Challenges for Technological Development in China’s Industry
China Perspectives, 54 | July- August 2004
6
transport,  and  other  overhead  costs34.  In  a  word,  located  at  the  lower  end  of  the
international division of labour, the nation has yet to achieve much in added-value and
raise its competitive advantage significantly. This may also explain the discrepancy of
trade statistics between the Chinese and American sources: products considered “high-
tech” in China may not be elsewhere.
20 Third, in sectors where China is enjoying a certain level of competitiveness, much of it
has come from foreign-invested enterprises (sanzi qiye). In 2000, for example, 92.5% of
computer systems and 96.4% of mobile communications equipments were exported by
foreign-invested enterprises35. In 2002, wholly-owned foreign enterprises contributed
55.4% of China’s high-tech exports, while state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have seen its
portion  declining  year  over  year36.  FDI  to  China  is  supposed  to  diffuse  advanced
technology  to  Chinese  enterprises  and  make  them  technologically  competitive;
unfortunately, the high-tech exports statistics show a different picture.
21 The above analysis seems to indicate another reality about China’s high-tech sector and
industry: They have developed rapidly, but they are structurally risky–processing- and
assembling-focused,  low-end  product-oriented  and  low  value-added,  and  foreign-
invested enterprise-led. China may make and export “high-tech” products in a large
quantity, but may not enjoy higher added value as high-tech products are supposed to
do, as a larger share of its companies’ profits go to owners of core high technologies.
The situation has not improved, and therefore the growth is probably unsustainable. To
become a high-tech power, China has to move beyond the advantage that it offers in
terms of labour in order to gain a competitive edge in a “cluster” of technologies to
enable it to climb the technology value chain.
Broader problems
22 Since the early 1980s, in an effort to explore the Chinese way of technology diffusion,
new technology enterprises spun off from China’s research institutes and universities
have competed with MNCs. Many of them have been successful because of their strong
connection  with  the  institutions  from  which  they  were  spun  off–Legend  with  the
Chinese  Academy  of  Sciences  (CAS),  Founder  with  Peking  University,  and  so  on.
Although they  were  financially  humble  at  their  start,  they  had  access  to  staff  and
facilities, and more importantly, could take advantage of research achievements made
in these institutions–mainly the results  of  the state investment during the planned
economy period37.
23 This strategy seems to have worked out well thus far. But further development of these
technology enterprises is more unsure. 
24 First,  many  of  China’s  industrial  firms  have  few  financial  resources  to  carry  out
innovative R&D activities. Large- and medium-sized enterprises have spent on average
0.5%-0.8% of their sales on R&D (Table 4)38. According to a survey, firms within high-
tech parks spent an average 1.9% of their sales on R&D, far below the 5% standard by
the Chinese definition of  a  high-tech firm,  as  noted above,  while  those outside the
parks merely 0.63%39. As enterprises have been cautious in their R&D spending, a fair
guess would be that the industry could not afford to spend money on technology40.
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4. Enterprise technology-related expenditure (100 million yuan)
NB: n.a.= not available
Source: National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Science and Technology (eds.), China Statistical
Yearbook on Science and Technology, Peking, China Statistics Press, various years.
25 Second, is the lack of qualified personnel because of a severe “brain drain” of Chinese
talent to foreign countries as well as to foreign-invested enterprises in China. In 2002,
in  large-  and medium-sized SOEs,  personnel  involved in  technological  development
accounted for  5% of  the  total  employees,  and only  about  one-quarter  of  them had
technological development units, representing a steady decline since the 1990s41. As a
result, even after acquiring designs from MNCs, SOEs still lack the depth of engineering
expertise42.
26 Third, there is always the question of how this limited amount of resources is utilised.
In pursuing quick profits, almost all the Chinese enterprises are keen to import foreign
technology  as  the  way  to  upgrade  production  technology,  while  in  such purchases
equipment dominates over software such as patents, know-how, blueprints, and so on.
Between 1991 and 2002, a very limited amount of the spending on technology imports
was  used to  obtain  a  technology licence,  while  95% went  on hardware.  Large-  and
medium-sized enterprises spent more on technology importation than R&D until 1999
(see Table 1). And once the equipment is imported, almost no financial resources are
given to absorption, assimilation and innovation43, thus resulting in a vicious cycle of
“importing, lagging behind, importing again, and lagging behind again”.
27 Fourth, enterprises also lack interest in engaging domestic institutions of learning for
R&D efforts. The reform of the science and technology system since the mid-1980s has
to some extent activated the enthusiasm of researchers in these institutions (the supply
side of technology), but enterprises (the demand side) have been reluctant to acquire
technology from domestic sources. That is to say, the organisational rigidity between
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enterprises and institutions of learning have not been solved44. Such a problem may be
due to the culture conflict between industry and academia. For example, in late 1998
when  the  Chinese  Academy  of  Sciences  (CAS)  launched  an  ambitious  Knowledge
Innovation Programme to build the academy into the nation’s centre in basic research
and high-tech development, one of the measures was a reverse takeover of the CAS
Institute of Computing Technology by Legend which spun off the institute 14 years ago.
But the marriage ended in divorce as both sides had difficulty accommodating each
other45.
28 Fifth,  consequently,  few Chinese  enterprises  own independent  intellectual  property
rights in core technologies, as the data on patents suggest (Figures 5 and 6)46. Chinese
firms  seem to  be  more  interested  in  utility  model  and  design  patents  that  link  to
unsubstantial modification, but lag far behind their foreign counterparts in invention
patents. Since the 1990s, out of the more than 273,000 invention patent applications,
only  47,452  (or  17.4%)  were  from  Chinese  firms,  which  were  granted  5,876.  When
Chinese enterprises have been busy importing technology, foreign entities, most likely
MNCs, have grabbed 63.2% of total invention patents from China. Their expansion of
technology  reach  in  China  may  further  restrain  China’s  industrial  technology.  For
example, China’s pharmaceutical industry is built on modelling generic or off-patent
drugs from abroad47; of the more than 1,000 core patents on colour TVs, none belong to
China; 92% of the 426 third-generation (3G) mobile communications invention patent
applications  filed  in  China  were  from  abroad,  while  China’s  Huawei  Technologies
ranked  eighth  with  23  applications,  about  a  quarter  of  Samsung’s48;  in  the
petrochemicals industry, patent applications from MNCs accounted for 90% of the total;
and in  the  aerospace  industry,  there  are  30  times  more  invention patents  filed by
foreign firms than by domestic ones49.  Of the invention patents received by China’s
Patent  Administration  between  1987  and  2002  in  the  areas  of  optical  technology,
photography and information storage, 75%, 81% and 89% were from foreigners50. The
serious  question is  what  the  bottom line  for  the  Chinese  economy will  be  if  MNCs
continue to define the technological agenda and set the tone for the path of economic
development.
29 As a result, a yawning gap remains between the finest corporations in China and the
world. The nation has yet to come up with a China-created product as Japan in the early
1970s or South Korea in the 1990s51, and not one of China’s largest SOEs, or “national
teams” as they are referred to, have become a globally competitive giant with a global
market, a global brand, and a global procurement system52. These seem to be a bitter
assessment of the Chinese industry’s situation, but it is fair.
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5. Invention patents granted in China (%)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Science and Technology (eds), China Statistical
Yearbook on Science and Technology 2003, op. cit., p. 434.
Recent moves in China’s industrial technological development
30 Entry to the WTO has brought more challenges and fiercer competition and Chinese
firms are facing a crisis. The phasing out of many tariffs means the gradually eroded
price advantage of domestic products and the domination of technology, quality and
cost,  rather  than  price  in  competition.  Without  access  to  updated  technology  and
managerial  know-how,  the  Chinese  firms  may  lose  their  battle  with  their  foreign
competitors. In the meantime, MNCs have expanded their presence in China opening
independent R&D centres and collaborating with Chinese researchers. This is part of
the global development strategy of the parent companies–being close to their Chinese
operations  and  localising  technology  developed  in  the  “home  base”–so  that  their
contribution to China’s R&D should not be exaggerated. But it is possible for MNCs to
tap the high-quality researchers, even from domestic enterprises, so as to strengthen
their position beyond the advantage of cheap labour in their production in China53.
Under these circumstances, it is a matter of ultimate responsibility and survival, not
choice, for China’s domestic enterprises to upgrade their technologies and products on
their own. In this regard, the Chinese government has also tried its best to stimulate
innovation and provide policy guidance.
Increased R&D activities in enterprises
31 In 2000, enterprise spending in China’s R&D exceeded 60% for the first time, implying
that enterprises have become more important in research and innovation. A study of
all high-tech firms in the Haidian district of Peking where the Zhongguancun Science
Park is  located finds  that  current  sales  revenue of  the  firm provides  an important
driving  force  for  private  R&D  expenditure54.  Between  2000  and  2003,  the  top  100
domestic electronics and information enterprises spent on average some 3% of annual
sales  revenue on R&D (the  number  is  not  satisfying  but  promising),  with  telecoms
equipment  manufacturers  Huawei  Technologies,  Datang  Telecommunications,  and
Zhongxing Telecommunications leading the way, each devoting about 10% of the sales
revenue to R&D, well-qualified as high-tech firms even by international standards55.
Nationwide,  of  the  more  than  10  million  medium-  and  small-sized  firms,  150,000
allocate more than 5% of sales to technological development56.
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6. Utility model and design patents granted in China 
(%)
Source : National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Science and Technology (eds), China Statistical
Yearbook on Science and Technology 2003, op. cit., p. 434.
32 Some of the most technology-intensive companies have taken the R&D issue seriously
by establishing or reinforcing their R&D institutes57. For example, in Shenzhen, 477 (or
91.7%) of the 521 R&D institutes are associated with enterprises, and 90% of the R&D
personnel work in enterprises58. Legend, Founder, Chunlan, among others, have central
research academies oriented towards developing process and product technologies and
long-term technology strategies. Several Chinese corporations have also set up R&D
centres abroad as they expand internationally59.
33 Huawei is a case of point. Founded in 1988, it mandated in its charter to devote 10% of
its sales revenue to R&D, and increase the expenditure if necessary. Forty percent of
the company’s employees are engaged in R&D, and the company is also involved in
exploratory research60. In 2002, Huawei achieved a sales revenue of 17.2 billion yuan, of
which  3  billion  yuan  (or  17.8%)  were  spent  on  R&D.  The  company  now  owns  686
patented technologies with 85% being invention patents, and its intelligence network
won China’s Scientific and Technological Progress Award in 2002, a rare but impressive
achievement61.
The government’s technology policy
34 The  government  has  also  aimed  to  stimulate  the  building-up  of  an  indigenous
technological capability in industry. The 1997 National Conference on Technological
Innovation promoted the role of enterprises in the nation’s R&D activities. Immediately
following  the  conference,  the  then State  Economic  and  Trade  Commission  selected
Baoshan  Iron  and  Steel,  Changhong,  Jiangnan  Shipbuilding,  Northern  China
Pharmaceuticals (all SOEs), Hai’er (a collective), and Founder (a university spin-off) to
experiment  in  technological  innovation62.  At  the  1999  National  Conference  on
Technological  Innovation,  the  government  further  demanded  that  high-tech
enterprises spend at least 5% of their annual sales on R&D63. The most recent policy
measures include allowing R&D expenditure to  be counted as  cost,  implementing a
technology standard- and patent-focused strategy in enterprise innovation endeavours,
and supporting software products “Made in China” in government procurements64.
35 In the information and communications technology (ICT) sectors, emphasis has been on
developing China’s semiconductor industry. Firms have been encouraged to develop
central  processing  units  (CPUs)  used  in  certain  consumer  electronics  products  and
mobile  phone handsets.  Attention has  also  been paid  to  design application specific
integrated  circuits  (ASICs)  used  in  ICT,  a  sector  with  advanced  technological
sophistication, wider usability as well as higher added value. China’s computer industry
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has  campaigned  for  the  introduction  and  use  of  the  open-source  Linux  operating
system and related application software packages. Due to the government mandate, the
Linux-based operating system and office applications developed by Chinese software
companies have eroded Microsoft’s dominance in software procurement, which signals
not only the sensitivity, given the size of the procurement and strategic importance,
but also the viability for these companies65.  Under these circumstances, Microsoft was
put  on the defensive and agreed to  invest  6.2  billion yuan to  help develop China’s
software industry and China’s e-government initiative66.
36 One  of  the  high-profile  technology  policy  measures  is  the  so-called  “technology
standards”  strategy  by  which  China  intends  to  formulate  its  own  standards  that
leverage  its  large  market  in  international  competition67.  China’s  participation  in
worldwide 3G wireless communications standard setting is one such example.
37 China’s  telecoms  equipment  manufacturing  sector  was  among  the  first  to  open  to
global competition as well as the sector where domestic players have attained critical
mass. China began its massive telecoms equipment manufacturing industry in the early
1980s.  Initially,  technology  transfers  through  direct  imports  and  Sino-foreign  joint
ventures  played  an  important  role.  Through  absorbing  and  assimilating  foreign
technology and most importantly indigenous R&D efforts, Chinese firms, represented
by Great Dragon, Datang, Zhongxing and Huawei (“JuDaZhongHua” according to the
first  characters  of  the  firms’  Chinese  names),  have  gradually  acquired  advanced
technology  and  accumulated  technology  capability  to  develop  their  own  products.
These firms employ a higher percentage of scientists and engineers with masters and
doctorate degrees, and invest 10% or more of their sales revenue in R&D68. They may
still  lack  critical  technology  such  as  ASICs,  and  could  acquire  them  through
participating  in  the  international  division  of  labour–outsourcing  those  to  foreign
firms69;  they are not in the same league with the world’s big players either in size,
technology,  quality,  or  performance  of  the  equipment,  because  most  of  the
manufacturers are technology followers rather than innovators; and by the time they
reverse-engineer the imported products and develop the manufacturing capability to
imitate  them, their  international  competitors  will  have  introduced  a  successive
generation. Nevertheless, because of their presence, foreign firms have to bow out of
the  low-end  product  market,  or  reduce  prices  for  similar  products  sold  in  China.
Domestic  suppliers  accounted  for  43%  of  the  stored  programme-controlled  central
office switches in 2000 from none in 1982 (the statistics from another angle show why
China’s  international  competitiveness in  communications  exports  increased  as
discussed above)70.
38 Therefore, as China is, along with other countries moving towards the 3G, it offers a
domestically  proposed  and  the  International  Telecommunications  Union-approved
standard–TD-SCDMA, jointly developed by China’s Datang and Germany’s Siemens–to
compete with the cdma2000 standard by the US mobile network developer Qualcomm,
the owner of key patents behind the code division multiple access (CDMA) standard,
and  the  wideband  CDMA  (WCDMA)  standard,  also  known  as  universal  mobile
telecommunications  service  (UMTS),  from  Europe.  The  Chinese  government  also
allocated more  radio  spectrum to  the  home-grown TD-SCDMA standard than to  its
competitors–WCDMA and CDMA2000.  Although the Chinese standard may not be as
advanced as the other two standards and it may be premature to suggest that one of
China’s  mobile  operators  would  adopt  the  standard,  the  case itself–which  may  be
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labelled  technonationalist–at  least  suggests  that  China’s  technical  community  has
realised the importance of  independent intellectual  property rights and devoted its
innovative capabilities to developing the most advanced technology. It remains to be
seen whether the government initiative will lead to indigenous innovation at the firm
level.
39 China’s high-tech sector and industry have gained in vitality in the past two decades.
But much of the development has been built on a massive infusion of foreign capital
and FDI-embodied technology. It is quite understandable for a developing country like
China to follow the technology importation path in its development. But for how long
should China adopt such a development strategy?
40 Japan, Taiwan and South Korea all experienced the lag between technology importation
and  indigenous  innovation.  For  example,  when  South  Korea  started  heavy-and-
chemical-industry-led  industrialisation  in  the  1960s,  it  chose  to  import  foreign
technology. Later on, through establishing the enterprise as the important player in
the national innovation system and providing policy guidance, the country has seen
endogenous  innovation-driven  development71.  Korean  firms  have  gradually  moved
from original  equipment manufacturing (OEM) to own design manufacturing (ODM)
and own brand manufacturing (OBM) so as to garnish much added value72. One would
expect China to develop along the same trajectory.
41 In the meantime, the experiences of Asia’s newly industrialised economies also suggest
that it is not technology importation, but rather the lack of local absorptive capacity to
assimilate,  adapt,  and  improve  imported  technology,  that  leads  to  dependency  on
foreign technology; and heavy reliance on FDI as a means of technology transfer may to
some extent reinforce such dependency73. China’s economic development seems to be
at a critical juncture as it faces the danger of dependency.
42 Notwithstanding the many advantages that would push China to overcome its current
technological slump and to nurture a knowledge-based economy in the twenty-first
century, the creation of new products and services resulting from innovations will be
easily accommodated by a large domestic market that has started to be affluent, thus
paving the way for even more innovations. However, the market advantage as well as
comparative advantage in labour in many years to come could also discourage Chinese
firms from attempting innovation. For one thing, combining its strengths in low-cost
manufacturing and marketing channels with after-sales service capabilities, China has
successfully  overcome  its  weaknesses  in  quality,  which  probably  gives  firms  less
incentive to do well in the first place. The leverages of its market mean that China will
likely  continue  having  access  to  foreign  technology.  But  only  through  enhanced
technological capacity could China assume a leading position in the world market and
enhance the position of domestic firms vis-à-vis those from the advanced industrialised
nations74.
43 China’s technological capability in industry is still weak, which, plus the lack of urgency
to pay attention to innovation among Chinese firms, makes an outlook that is not so
optimistic. The current technology policy–playing the standards game–in fact signals
its  weaknesses,  as  China  in  the  globalisation  process  has  gained  little  in  domestic
capabilities. Of course, while it may be tempting to attribute the lack of technological
innovation in Chinese enterprises to the bottleneck that inhibits or impedes China’s
industrial development, technology is a determining factor. If some of China’s high-
tech  enterprises  at  the  very  beginning  were  successful  in  exploiting  and
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commercialising  research  results,  they  now run the  risk  of  becoming  so  large  and
bureaucratic  that  they  are  unable  to  continue  so  being,  as  has  happened  before
elsewhere75.  In  the  name of  diversification and joining  the  “Fortune 500  Club”,  for
example, Legend had expanded its business into system integration and services as well
as areas in which the company does not have the expertise to compete with established
firms, such as mobile phone handsets, digital cameras, management consulting, and
even real estate76. It has turned out to be a painful move and the firm recently had to
refocus on its PC business.
44 Emphasising the building of innovation and indigenous technological capability does
not  mean  that  institutional  arrangements  (industrial  policy,  venture  capital,  stock
markets,  etc.),  ownership,  and  enterprise  culture  are  secondary.  In  this  regard,  it
remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  standards-centred  technology  approach  would
stimulate  innovation,  or  protect  less  advanced  domestic  technology  and  hinder
technological development.
45 Since the issue of technological development in industry boils down to development of
local technological capability, then the final question has to be whether this capacity
can be created by enterprises alone. The creation of this technological capability would
be country, region or history specific. Many Silicon Valley firms have close relations
with  Stanford  University;  the  Japanese  example  shows  the  construction  of  that
capability began in the pre-Meiji era; and South Korea has emphasised the importance
of the educational system and the construction of a structure that massively supports
technology and engineering77. Of course, firm-specific characteristics also explain why
some push towards technological development. While what may have been proved to
be successful in other countries may not be so for China, although many of its high-tech
enterprises  did  spin  off  from  institutions  of  learning  in  the  1980s.  With  increased
investment  in  R&D but  limitations  in  personnel,  Chinese  enterprises  could  develop
technological capabilities by collaboration with universities and research institutes. In
the  meantime,  the  Chinese  government  has  granted  institutions  of  learning  more
leeway in  transferring  research results  achieved through government  funding.  The
government should also organise firms and institutions of learning to tackle common
technology78.
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